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INTRODUCTION
At her removal hearing, Afi Marie Apouviepseakoda testified
about the day when soldiers came to her house in Togo, looking for
her husband.1 Through an interpreter, she told the Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) about how soldiers ransacked her home, searched the place, and
confiscated personal documents and photos of her husband.2 They
were looking for her husband.3 And when Afi Marie could not tell the
soldiers where her husband was, the soldiers beat Afi Marie with their
fists and their batons for thirty minutes.4 The blows put her into a
hospital for ten days and made her brain swell. 5
Afterwards, Afi Marie recovered from her wounds, left the
hospital, and took her children to her mother's home in a different part
of Togo.6 From there, Afi Marie and her children fled to neighboring
Ghana and then to the United States.7 After six months in the States,
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 883 (7th Cir. 2007).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 895 (Posner, J., dissenting).
6
Id. at 884 (majority opinion).
7
Id.
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Afi Marie returned to Togo. Alone.8 She went to secure money and to
find her husband, whom she believed was in hiding in Ghana.9
Afi Marie's husband was a businessman in Togo.10 He was friends
with the mayor and held city contracts in waste disposal.11 He first
went into hiding when the mayor of Lome, the capital of Togo, had
been arrested and jailed.12 The mayor was a member of the opposition
political party, and the government became interested in Afi Marie's
husband because he was a known supporter and friend of the mayor.13
When he learned that the government was sending soldiers after him,
Afi Marie's husband fled.14
When Afi Marie went to look for her husband, she was able to
enter Togo with the help of a friend who was a lieutenant in the
army.15 Upon her arrival into Togo, a warrant was issued for Afi
Marie's arrest.16 Six days later, a second warrant for her arrest was
issued.17 Three days after that, a summons was issued requiring Afi
Marie's appearance before the police.18
During that time, Afi Marie stayed at her mother's house.19 She
was able to raise some money for herself and her children, but she was
not able to find any information on the whereabouts or well-being of
her husband.20 Afi Marie once again enlisted the help of her friend in

8

Id.
Id.
10
Id. at 883.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 883.
15
Id. at 884.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
9
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the military to help her back out of the country.21 She returned to the
United States, this time to Chicago, where she sought asylum.22
This is the story that Afi Marie began to tell during her removal
hearing. But before she could get very far in this explanation, the IJ
told her:
[Y]ou have to speak up so I can hear your voice. Today
passiveness and demureness is not the regiment [sic] of
the day. Today aggressiveness and loudness is [sic] the
regiment [sic] of the day and you can even scream at
the Court. I will not take offense to that, but I want to
hear your voice. So, if you force me repeatedly to ask
you to raise your voice I will not be pleased. And also
might indicate the posture of your case as well. If
you’re really strong in your convictions you’ll express
it in a strong manner. If your answers are weak the
Court may believe that you’re [sic] claim is also weak
so conduct yourself accordingly.23
Then, at the end of her hearing, the IJ denied Afi Marie’s asylum
application on the basis of an adverse credibility determination.24 The
IJ held that Afi Marie was simply not believable.25
Central to asylum law is the simple premise that a refugee's
testimony, in and of itself, can be enough to show eligibility.26 The
rationale is based upon the fact that refugees come from places where
documentation is difficult to obtain, where governments are corrupt or

21

Id.
Id.
23
Id. at 897 (Posner, J., dissenting) (quoting IJ’s statement during the asylum
hearing).
24
Id. at 884 (majority opinion).
25
See Id.
26
See Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 969 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(a) (2007)).
22
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ineffective, and where the refugee's life is in immediate peril.27 Under
such circumstances, it is simply illogical to require, in addition to
escaping with one's life, that the refugee also escape with
incontrovertible documentary proof.
In a perfect world, we would be able to take the asylum applicants
at their word, and we would not have to worry about credibility. But
taking the applicants at their word is difficult. The benefits of asylum
are numerous, 28 and this creates a substantial incentive to lie.29
Sitting as the gatekeeper to asylum is the Immigration Judge. The
IJ is tasked with serving the traditional role of the judge in an
adversarial proceeding.30 The IJ is also responsible for ensuring that
the record is fully developed for each asylum applicant.31
Although this dual role may benefit the applicant, it also creates a
potential problem. IJs are only human, and might exhibit bias against
the asylum applicant. In a traditional jury trial, bias might not be
problematic, as the trial judge’s ability to participate is limited.
However, because the IJ is acting as both fact-finder and advocate, the
risk that bias may compromise a decision is magnified. This note will
argue that, where the IJ makes an adverse credibility determination,
27

“Indeed, we frequently have acknowledged that it is unreasonable to expect
asylum applicants to procure corroborating documents when official records are ‘in
disarray,’ either because of war, revolution or simply lack of institutional regularity.”
Korniejew v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 377, 387 (7th Cir. 2004).
28
8 U.S.C. §1158(c)(1) (2006) states:
In the case of an alien granted asylum under subsection (b) of this
section, the Attorney General
(A) shall not remove or return the alien to the alien's country of
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, the
country of the alien's last habitual residence;
(B) shall authorize the alien to engage in employment in the United
States and provide the alien with appropriate endorsement of that
authorization; and
(C) may allow the alien to travel abroad with the prior consent of
the Attorney General.
29
See Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 892.
30
8 U.S.C. §1229a(b)(1) (2006); 8 C.F.R. §1240.1(c) (2007).
31
See 8 U.S.C. §1229a(b)(1).
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courts should apply a contamination theory that calls for remand
where the IJ exhibits bias.
In Part I, I will discuss the critical role of the Immigration Judge
in asylum proceedings. In Part II, I will discuss the case of
Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales. In Part III, I will discuss how a
contamination theory of IJ bias will better achieve the goals of asylum
law.
I. IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND THE ASYLUM PROCESS
The realities of removal hearings make it difficult to determine
whether an asylum applicant satisfies these requirements of past
persecution or reasonable fear of future persecution. Asylum
applicants almost always need the aid of an interpreter. They will
frequently be unable to obtain direct documentary proof.32
Furthermore, asylum applicants frequently arrive from countries with
customs and cultures that are very different from what the IJs will be
familiar with.33 This is what the IJ must deal with on a daily basis.
A. The role of the IJ
For the most part, the IJ functions as any other judge.34 The IJ
directs discovery, hears motions, conducts case management, and
controls the removal hearing.35 However, in the immigration court
system, the IJ takes on responsibilities that are permissible because of
the fact that it is an administrative court. The IJ is also charged with
ensuring that the parties can fully develop the record.36 An IJ may
32

Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1085 (7th Cir. 2004) (“direct
authentication or verification of an alien’s testimony and/or evidence is typically
very difficult and often impossible”).
33
Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d 897 (Posner, J., dissenting).
34
8 C.F.R. §1240.1(c).
35
8 U.S.C. §1229a(b)(1).
36
Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 549 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Hasanaj v.
Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 701 (7th Cir. 2004), for the proposition that the IJ has an
obligation to establish the record).
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question a witness, and it does not necessarily matter if the IJ asks
more questions than either party’s counsel.37 The IJ need only avoid
exhibiting "impatience, hostility, or a predisposition" against the
asylum applicant.38 In addition, the IJ can bar evidence or testimony if
it would be irrelevant, unreliable, duplicative, or otherwise a waste of
judicial time.39 The only limit to this discretion is that the judge should
not bar whole chunks of the applicant's case.40
B. Asylum: An Overview
To be eligible for asylum, the applicant must be a refugee.41 As
defined by statute, a refugee is one who is unable or unwilling to
return to their country due to persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution.42 Persecution is described as actions that are distinguished
from mere harassment, even if such harassment would be unfair,
unjust, unlawful, or unconstitutional.43 To show that she has been
persecuted, an applicant must show that she has suffered harm such as,
“detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal
searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings, or torture”
inflicted for political or religious reasons.44
37

Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 887.
Huang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 945,948 (7th Cir. 2005).
39
Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 887.
40
Kerciku v. INS, 314 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2003).
41
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l) (2006).
42
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
43
Firmansjah v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 2005).
44
Id. (quoting Toptchev v. I.N.S., 295 F.3d 714,720 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotations omitted)). Many of the asylum cases that reach the Seventh Circuit
require the court to place the harm that the asylum applicant suffers on a point on
that persecution spectrum. This has lead to what seems to be comparison of evils in
terms of what degree of harm inflicted that it will take to be granted asylum. For
example, in reversing an IJ’s determination that the harm suffered did not rise to the
level of persecution, the court in Tchemkou v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 785, 791-792 (7th
Cir. 2007) cited the following examples:
See, e.g., Gomes v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 746, 754 (7th Cir. 2007)
(reversing agency finding of no persecution where petitioner had
38
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In the alternative, an applicant can obtain asylum where she can
show a well-founded fear of persecution.45 In such a case, the asylum
applicant needs to show that her fear of future persecution is
subjectively and objectively reasonable.46 The subjective component is
satisfied via credibility determination that the applicant possesses
actual fear.47 The objective component is satisfied by showing
“credible, direct and specific evidence in the record of facts that would
support a reasonable fear that the petitioner faces persecution.”48
If the asylum applicant’s claim is rejected, the asylum applicant
may appeal to another administrative court, the applicant may make
file a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider.49 Motions to reopen
are will be granted where the asylum applicant is aware of new
material facts or evidence that was not reasonably available at the time

been beaten, had his home invaded and had been threatened, and
noting that “[t]here is no requirement ... that a person must endure
repeated beatings and physical torment in order to establish past
persecution”); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 737 (7th Cir.
2005) (holding that imprisonment for two weeks, during which
time petitioner was beaten, denied adequate food and water, and
had salt rubbed in his wounds, constituted past persecution);
Vaduva v. INS, 131 F.3d 689, 690 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that “the
Board reasonably concluded Vaduva ... suffered at least one
instance of political persecution” when “he was beaten up (he was
punched, his face bruised, and his finger broken) by strangers who
told him to stay away from the pro-democratic forces in the
country”).
Tchemkou, 495 F.3d at 791-792.
45
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R.
1208.16(b)(2) (2007).
46
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,430-31 (1987); Liu v. Ashcroft, 380
F.3d 307, 312 (7th Cir 2004).
47
Liu, 380 F.3d at 313.
48
Id. (quoting Ahmad v. INS, 163 F.3d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted)).
49
8 C.F.R. §1003.23(b)(1) (2007).
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of the initial removal hearing.50 Motions to reconsider will be granted
where the IJ has made errors of law or fact.51
The denied asylum applicant may also file an appeal of the IJ’s
decision with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).52 Asylum
applicants may appeal to these three-member panels as a matter of
right.53 If the BIA affirms the IJ’s denial, the asylum applicant then can
take her appeal outside of the administrative system by filing a petition
for review in the relevant Circuit Court of Appeals.54
C. IJ Bias
On appeal, IJ bias can be attacked in two ways. First, where the
application is denied on the merits of the claim, the applicant may
challenge the IJ’s behavior as denying due process.55 Aliens must be
given “a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against the
alien, to present evidence on the alien's own behalf, and to crossexamine witnesses presented by the Government.”56A petition for
review may be granted where the applicant is denied a “full and fair
opportunity to put on [their] case.”57 Ultimately, the question is
whether the asylum applicant had a full and fair opportunity to present
her case.58 Similarly, if by asking questions to the applicant, an IJ

50

Id. at (b)(3).
Id. at (b)(2).
52
8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(a) (2007).
53
See id.; 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(a)(3) (2007).
54
8 U.S.C. §1251(a)(1), (b)(2) (2006).
55
See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); Floroiu v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d
970, 973 (7th Cir. 2007).
56
8 U.S.C. §1229a(b)(4)(B) (2006).
57
Floriou, 481 F.3d at 974 (quoting Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 548 (7th
Cir. 2006)).
58
Rodriguez Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529, 538 (7th Cir. 2005).
51
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begins to act as if the IJ were an attorney for the government, the
petition for review should be granted.59
Second, if the IJ denies the application on the basis of an adverse
credibility determination, the asylum applicant can challenge IJ bias
by challenging the adverse credibility determination itself. In making
an adverse credibility determination, the IJ may rely upon
inconsistencies between documents in the record or the testimony of
the asylum applicant.60 However, to support an adverse credibility
determination, an inconsistency in the testimony must be substantial,
and it must constitute a linchpin of the asylum claim.61
The adverse credibility determination is not necessarily fatal to an
asylum applicant’s claim. An applicant can rehabilitate her claims by
providing corroborating evidence.62 However, because documentary
evidence may simply not be available for certain types of injuries or
from certain countries, the IJ must explain why it would be reasonable
to expect the corroborating evidence before the IJ can penalize the
applicant for failing to provide it.63 Thus, if the asylum applicant is
unable to produce the required corroborating evidence, the IJ must
allow the asylum applicant to explain that failure.64 Where the IJ does
not accept the applicant's explanation, the IJ must state a specific
reason why the failure to produce is unacceptable.65

59

Id. at 538-39. See Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir. 2007) (“An
immigration judge has a responsibility to function as a neutral, impartial arbiter and
must refrain from taking on the role of advocate for either party.”).
60
Korniejew v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 377, 382-83 (7th Cir. 2004)..
61
See id. at 383-384.
62
Gontcharova v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 2004).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 877.
65
Id.
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II. APOUVIEPSEAKODA V. GONZALES
The IJ denied Afi Marie's request for asylum and ordered Afi
Marie removed to Togo.66 The BIA summarily affirmed the decision.67
Afi Marie filed her petition for review with the Seventh Circuit.
A. The Immigration Court
In addition to her testimony, Afi Marie brought a medical
certificate issued at the time of her hospitalization, as well as some
photos that were taken at the hospital.68 Other documents submitted
included two arrests warrants issued against Afi Marie by the Togolese
government; her membership card to the opposition party; letters from
the opposition party’s First Vice President, her father, and her cousins;
and country reports issued by the State Department and Amnesty
International.69 She also brought two witnesses: her daughter and a
family friend who had fled Togo in 1996.70
Nevertheless, the IJ made an adverse credibility determination
against Afi Marie at the end of her removal hearing and found that her
proffered documentary evidence did not sufficiently corroborate her
claims.71 The IJ did not reach the merits of Afi Marie’s claims and did
not analyze whether Afi Marie would have qualified for asylum if her
story were believable.

66

Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 883.
68
Id. at 890.
69
Decision of the Immigration Judge at 3, In the Matter of Afi Marie
Apouviepseakoda, Immigration Court, Chicago, Illinois, (June 14, 2004) (File: A78863-025), available at www.ca7.uscourts.gov (follow “Briefs” link, search for case
No. 05-3752, follow “05-3752” link, follow “05-3752_002.pdf” link).
70
Brief of Petitioner at 20, Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881 (7th
Cir. 2007) (No. 05-3752), available at www.ca7.uscourts.gov (follow “Briefs” link,
search for case No. 05-3752, follow “05-3752” link, follow “05-3752_001.pdf”
link).
71
Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 884.
67
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1. Adverse credibility determination
The IJ began by identifying six bases upon which he found Afi
Marie’s testimony to be unbelievable.72 First, he found her explanation
as to why she was being targeted to be “vague and unconvincing.”73
The IJ noted that Afi Marie claimed that the Togolese government was
targeting her family because of her husband.74 Given that her husband
was not directly supporting the opposition party but was merely
supporting the mayor, who happened to be a member of the opposition
party, the IJ thought that this was a tenuous basis for the government
to target her and her family.75
This tenuousness continued to be a concern in the second basis for
the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. Surely, if Afi Marie truly
were a card-carrying member of the opposition party, 76 the soldiers
who came to her home would have taken her documents too, in
addition to her husband’s. 77
The third basis for the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was
his disbelief that Afi Marie was hospitalized for ten days.78 The
medical certificate seemed to have inconsistent dates on it. Although it
was dated on September 18, 2001, the document’s text indicated that
Afi Marie would be discharged on the 28th.79 To the IJ, this indicated
that the document seemed to know the future.80 In addition, the
document was signed by “Dr. Theophile Fonkoue, M.D., Gynecology-

72

Decision of the Immigration Judge, supra note 69, at 8-10.
Id. at 8.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 11.
77
Id. at 8.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 8-9.
73
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Obstetrics-General Medicine.”81 The IJ found it inconsistent that Afi
Marie would see a gynecologist, if she had actually been beaten. 82
The IJ next turned his attention to the photographs that Afi Marie
had submitted.83 These photographs were taken by Afi Marie’s cousin,
and they depicted Afi Marie in a medical facility.84 However, in the
pictures, it did not look like Afi Marie had been beaten at all.85 Afi
Marie’s face and arms did not seem to have any bruises or bandages
on them, which the IJ presumably anticipated would have been there if
Afi Marie had actually been beaten by soldiers for thirty minutes.86 In
addition, most of Afi Marie’s body was covered in those pictures.87 Afi
Marie was wearing a scarf covering her head, so any injuries that
would have been visible on her head were not depicted in the
pictures.88
The lack of visible injuries in the pictures only exacerbated an
additional problem that the IJ saw with the photographs – they seemed
to be dated incorrectly.89 They were all marked with what appeared to
be a stamp of “03 4 16.”90 The IJ saw that this too was an
inconsistency in Afi Marie’s testimony.91 She testified that she was
beaten in 2001, but the photos that she submitted as proof of the
resulting hospitalization did not seem to have been taken until 2003.92
The IJ reasoned that, if the photos were not taken during the

81

Id. at 9.
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 5, note 11.
91
Id. at 9.
92
Id.
82
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hospitalization as Afi Marie had claimed they were, this cast doubt
onto whether Afi Marie was ever hospitalized at all.93
Fourth, the IJ questioned the fact that Afi Marie was able to travel
safely back to Togo without being harmed or arrested. Typically, the
concern with applicants who are able to return to the country they fled
is that, if they were willing to return voluntarily, then the conditions
they had previously fled might not have been that bad after all.94
Indeed, other cases have laid out this concern more explicitly.95 And in
these cases, the conclusion drawn from the ability of a asylum
applicant to return to safely travel to and from their home country,
even if temporarily, is that the people who were persecuting the
applicants either have lost interest in exacting further persecution or
the harms that were previously inflicted were not that bad after all.96
The IJ in Apouviepseakoda was no exception, as the IJ expressed
incredulity at the fact that Afi Marie was able to travel into and out of
the country, despite the fact that warrants had been issued for her
arrest.97 Afi Marie explained that she was able to do so with the help
of a friend in the army.98 The IJ rejected this explanation in two parts.
First, he noted that, although Afi Marie mentioned her return to Togo
in her asylum application, this assistance of her military friend was
omitted in her asylum application.99 But what really stood out to the IJ
was the fact that Afi Marie took the time to go to the hospital.100 And
93

Id.
See Firmansjah v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 598, 606-607 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating
that, “We have recognized before that the absence of any evidence of harm to family
members undermines an applicant’s claim of a fear of future persecution.”).
95
Recently, the Seventh Circuit stated in a non-precedential decision: “The
fact that [the asylum applicant] has returned to [to her home country] several times
since her encounter, and that both her family members and those of her husband still
live there peacefully, undercuts her claim to fear returning.” Pupella v. Gonzales,
207 Fed.Appx. 683, 686 (7th Cir. 2006).
96
See id.
97
Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 891 (7th Cir. 2007).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
94
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what's more, she went to the very same hospital in her hometown that
had treated her for her post-beating injuries.101 Presumably, if Afi
Marie really did fear persecution, she would have avoided the places
that authorities would know to look for her.
Fifth, the IJ found a testimonial inconsistency as to the
whereabouts of her husband.102 She testified that her husband came to
the United States on August 20, 2002, and the affidavit of a friend
indicated that her husband was living with her in the States.103
However, her asylum application, which was submitted on August 22,
2002, stated that she had no idea where he was.104
Finally, the IJ found another consistency in the testimony that Afi
Marie’s husband returned to Togo from neighboring Ghana to try and
sell the radio station that he owned.105 The problem that the IJ had
with this testimony is similar to the problem he had with Afi Marie’s
ability to return to Togo.106 If Afi Marie, or her husband, was willing
to go back to Togo for something as mundane as selling a radio
station, then maybe the risks appurtenant were not all that bad.107
2. Corroborative evidence
Having made the adverse credibility determination, the IJ then
evaluated whether any of the documentary evidence rehabilitated Afi
Marie’s claim.108 The IJ began his analysis by evaluating the submitted
photographs and medical record for a second time, again stating that
the photos did not prove any injuries and seemed to be taken after the
101

Id.
Decision of the Immigration Judge at 9-10, In the Matter of Afi Marie
Apouviepseakoda, Immigration Court, Chicago, Illinois, (June 14, 2004) (File: A78863-025), available at www.ca7.uscourts.gov (follow “Briefs” link, search for case
No. 05-3752, follow “05-3752” link, follow “05-3752_002.pdf” link).
103
Id. at 10-11.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 10
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
102
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dates Afi Marie claimed injury.109 On the second time around however,
the IJ attributed another fault to the medical certificate, this time
noting that it was suspicious that the document was signed by a
consulting doctor.110
The IJ then evaluated other forms of corroborating evidence, none
of which was sufficient to rehabilitate Afi Marie’s credibility.111 First,
Afi Marie submitted two warrants issued by the Togolese government
for her arrest.112 The IJ found the arrest warrants for Afi Marie issued
by the Togolese government to be suspect because one of the warrants
referred to Afi Marie as a “Mme” and the other referred to her as a
“Mlle.”113 In addition, one of the arrest warrants was issued after she
returned to Togo, but it did not seem to affect her ability to leave using
her own passport.114
The IJ then proceeded to give similarly brief analysis to the rest of
Afi Marie’s documents. The IJ did not give any weight to Afi Marie’s
membership in the opposition political party because, although she
submitted a membership card, there was no indication on the card that
Afi Marie was a dues-paying member.115
Similarly, the IJ declined to give much weight to the letters from
the opposition political party’s First Vice President because it did not
mention the fact that Afi Marie was beaten or that Afi Marie’s husband
had contributed to the party.116 The letter written by her father suffered
the same shortcoming in the eyes of the IJ.117 It, too, failed to mention
Afi Marie’s 2001 beating.118

109

Id. at 11.
Id. at 8.
111
Id. 11-12.
112
Id. at 11.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
110
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The affidavit of a friend who knew Afi Marie’s family in Togo
was rejected because the affiant had left for the United States prior to
the events upon which Afi Marie founded her claim.119 The IJ did not
even bother to discuss the contents of this affidavit.
Photocopied letters from her cousins in Togo indicated that her
home had been looted and that the reigning political party was upset
with her for contacting opposition activists.120 The IJ dismissed these
letters as exaggerations.121
Even the Togo country reports issued by the Amnesty
International and U.S. State Department were not sufficient to help Afi
Marie.122 They only went so far as to establish that political activists
might be targeted in Togo. However, they did not establish that Afi
Marie herself would be targeted.123
After reviewing the evidence, the IJ found that Afi Marie was not
credible and that her documentary submissions were not sufficient to
rehabilitate her credibility.124 The IJ thus denied Afi Marie’s
application for asylum125
B. Seventh Circuit Majority
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Afi Marie made two arguments.
First, she argued that the IJ erred in making an adverse credibility
determination.126 Second, Afi Marie argued that the IJ's conduct during

119

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. The IJ also denied Afi Marie’s applications for withholding from
removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. These forms of relief
were similarly denied for the same reasons why he denied the asylum claim. Id. at
12-14.
126
Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2007).
120
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the removal hearing denied her due process.127 The Seventh Circuit
rejected both of Afi Marie's arguments.128
1. Due Process Challenge
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit first looked to Afi Marie's
argument that IJ bias in her removal hearing denied her due process.129
The majority noted that “the form of [the IJ's] interruptions were
occasionally jarring,”130 but this was not enough to warrant remand.131
In reviewing the IJ's behavior, the Seventh Circuit seemed to ignore
any transgressions or excesses the IJ may have committed, so long as
the IJ was not barring testimony or evidence.132
First, the Seventh Circuit noted that Afi Marie's hearing lasted six
hours and reasoned that six hours was a strong indication that Afi
Marie had a reasonable opportunity to present her case.133 Second,
although the two witnesses who appeared at Afi Marie's hearing did
127

Id.
Id. at 893.
129
Id. at 884. This type of due process claim seems to be common amongst
petitioners before the Seventh Circuit. See id. at 885 (citing Rehman v. Gonzales,
441 F.3d 506, 508 (7th Cir. 2006); Boyanivsky v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 286, 292 (7th
Cir. 2006); Pornsivakulchai v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2006)). A
recent trend in the treatment of the due process challenge has been to reclassify these
arguments as statutory violations instead of constitutional claims: “In other words,
Apouviepseakoda, like many before her, has made the mistake of employing “flabby
constitutional arguments to displace more focused contentions,” and is really arguing
that the IJ’s hearing violated these statutory and regulatory provisions.”
Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 885 (internal citations omitted). However, Seventh
Circuit panels have been inconsistent in this nomenclature. Although no panel has
declined review for failure to correctly classify the claim, some panels apply the
flabby constitutional claim critique while others discuss the issue in terms of due
process. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit was willing to address Afi Marie’s
argument as if it were appropriately proposed. Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 884.
130
Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 887.
131
Id. at 889.
132
See id. at 888-889.
133
Id. at 889.
128
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not testify, the Seventh Circuit did not think it was a problem because
the IJ accepted the offer of proof on what their testimony would have
been.134
2. Adverse Credibility Determination
Having determined that the IJ’s behavior did not have an adverse
affect on Afi Marie’s case, the majority then evaluated the substance of
the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.135 First, the majority looked
at the two problems the IJ had with the photos that Afi Marie had
submitted with her claim.136 The Seventh Circuit joined in the IJ’s
critique that the photos could not offer evidence of the wounds
because Afi Marie was wearing a headdress and gown that covered the
areas she claimed were injured.137 Furthermore, the majority also
noted parenthetically that, in some of the pictures, Afi Marie appeared
to be relatively mobile.138
The IJ and the majority were also troubled by what appeared to be
a date stamp on all of the photos.139 It is unclear from the record as to
why, but the originals that were part of Afi Marie’s asylum files were
not before the IJ.140 Instead, the IJ only had photocopies available, and
these photocopies made it difficult to read what seemed to be a date
stamp “03 4 16” on all of the photos.141 On the one hand, if the 03
stood for 2003, that would mean that the pictures were taken almost
two years after Afi Marie claimed that the events had transpired in
2001. But on the other hand, Afi Marie filed her asylum claim in

134

Id. at 888-89.
Id. at 889.
136
Id. at 890.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
135
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2002.142 When asked about the “03 4 16” marking, Afi Marie could
only offer that she was not in Togo in 2003.143
The majority decided to address this issue by way of footnote,
explaining that the pictures may have been submitted even after the
2002 asylum application because it was not certain that photographs
were a part of that application:
[T]he application itself does not refer to these
documents or suggest additional attachments; the
exhibits offer no stamp to certify their filing with the
original application; and they do not carry any page
numbers that would suggest they are part of a package.
Finally, while some of the documents in these exhibits
are dated based on when they were translated into
English, the photos offer no indication of when they
were placed there.144
The majority took these shortcomings to be sufficient to support the
IJ’s concerns, reasoning that Afi Marie had simply failed to satisfy her
burden of explaining away this uncertainty.145
Second, the Seventh Circuit majority next looked to what has
often been a fatal fact to many other asylum applicant’s claims.146 The
Seventh Circuit majority echoed the IJ’s concern regarding Afi Marie’s
ability to return to Togo by noting that, not only did she return, she
went back to the same hospital she had last been the last time she
needed medical attention.147 Furthermore, unlike the first time, the
majority noted that the condition for which she was risking capture on

142

Id.
Id.
144
Id. at 890 n.5.
145
Id.
146
See Firmanshjah v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2005); Pupella v.
Gonzales, 207 Fed.Appx 683 (7th Cir. 2006).
147
Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 891.
143
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this second visit was not even a matter of life and death. It was
gynecological.148
3. Corroborative Evidence
In its review of the IJ’s treatment of Afi Marie’s corroborative
evidence, the majority rehashes many of the same inconsistencies in
the documentary evidence that it first propounded in its analysis of Afi
Marie’s testimony. Although Afi Marie presented several pieces of
corroborative evidence, the only new analysis the Seventh Circuit
majority conducts is to review the letter from Afi Marie’s father.149
Although the Seventh Circuit majority concedes that the letter does
describe hardships experienced by other members of her family and
warns Afi Marie to be cautious with whom she speaks with in United
States regarding Togo, both the IJ and the Seventh Circuit fault the
letter for not mentioning either Afi Marie’s arrest warrants or her
earlier beating.150
C. Judge Posner’s Dissent: A Critique in Three Parts
Judge Posner’s dissent in Afi Marie’s case is particularly scathing.
He begins by identifying the IJ by name in his dissent, adding that this
is not the first time that the Seventh Circuit has reviewed an allegation
that this particular IJ exhibited less than decorous behavior in a

148

Id. at 891 n.6 (stating that “This April visit to a gynecologist prompts us to
note a coincidence not recognized by the IJ.”) (emphasis in original). Afi Marie
testified that the beating and its subsequent hospitalization occurred in April, 2001.
Her return to that same Togo hospital also occurred in the month of April – the
implication being that, on both occasions, Afi Marie was simply visiting her
gynecologist for her annual exam. Notwithstanding that there was nothing in the
record to indicate whether Togolese standards in gynecology adopted the American
standard of care in annual exams, what the Seventh Circuit majority seems to be
doing is masking a de novo finding of fact by burying it in a footnote.
149
Id. at 892.
150
Id.
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removal hearing.151 Judge Posner notes that, the last time the Seventh
Circuit reviewed one of his decisions, the panel was left with “no idea
why the IJ ruled as he did.”152
Judge Posner’s dissent takes on three major issues in the majority
opinion. First, Judge Posner attacks the IJ’s evaluation of Afi Marie’s
evidence. Second, he addresses the inappropriateness of the IJ’s
behavior. Third, he then discusses how the problems in this case are
institutional.
1. On the IJ’s Reasoning
In reviewing the IJ’s decision in Afi Marie’s case, Judge Posner
addressed each inconsistency that the IJ identified. First, Judge Posner
notes that it is “often bad news” for the entire family of a person who
is a member of a political party that opposes a dictator.153 So, the IJ’s
confusion as to whether Afi Marie was targeted because of her own,
personal membership in the opposition party or because of her
husband’s connections to the mayor did not matter to Judge Posner.
Each basis could independently support an asylum claim.154
Judge Posner then addressed the IJ’s concerns over why the
soldiers were ransacking Afi Marie’s house.155 He found particularly
troubling the IJ’s conclusion that, because Afi Marie could not explain
why the soldiers did not find and take Afi Marie’s travel documents,
she must have been lying.156 In response, Judge Posner points out that
Afi Marie should not be blamed for her inability to explain the

151

“As is apparent from his opinion and from the transcript of the hearing, the
immigration judge, O. John Brahos, has, once again, ‘doubted the applicant’s
credibility on grounds that, because of factual error, bootless speculation, and errors
of logic, lack a rational basis.’” Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 894 (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Pramatarov v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 764, 765 (7th Cir 2006)).
152
Id. (quoting Gomes v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 746, 755 (7th Cir.2007)).
153
Id.
154
Id. (“[t]his is not an esoteric point, but Judge Brahos overlooked it”).
155
Id.
156
Id. at 894-895.
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soldier’s actions or omissions.157 After all, she could not possibly
know what the soldiers were each individually thinking at the time of
the ransacking. If she had offered any further explanation, it would
have been pure speculation.158
Judge Posner next addresses the IJ’s problems with the medical
certificate that Afi Marie submitted with her asylum claim. Although
the IJ found it problematic that Afi Marie was treated by a
gynecologist, Judge Posner quickly points out that the doctor who
signed the certificate listed his practices as “Gynecology-ObstetricsGeneral Medicine.”159 To Judge Posner, this indicated that, not only
was the doctor a gynecologist, but he also practiced general medicine,
which would have made the diagnosis the doctor gave within his realm
of expertise.160
Additionally, Judge Posner addresses a problem with other
assumptions of the IJ in regards to the medical certificate. The IJ
found it troubling that Afi Marie’s medical certificate was signed by a
consulting physician rather than a treating physician.161 Because a
treating physician would have had access to information regarding any
pre-existing conditions, only a treating physician, the IJ reasoned,
would have noted whether the injuries, if any, were the result of a new
trauma.162 The IJ then concluded that, because a consulting physician
would not have had similar access to prior medical history, the medical

157

Id. at 894.
Id. Judge Posner additionally suggests that, since the soldiers weren’t
looking for her or her children, it makes complete sense that they didn’t care about
their documents. Id.
159
Id. at 895.
160
Id. Afi Marie’s diagnosis was for “chronic insomnia, psychosis, and total
[illegible] cerebral edema.” Id. However, Judge Posner concedes a “genuine
anomaly” in the fact that the medical document was signed on September 18th but
indicated that Afi Marie would be discharged ten days later. Id. But he dismisses this
anomaly as being no more than a “mistake” that can be found in generally in medical
records, even in the U.S. Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 896.
158
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certificate signed by the consulting physician deserved little weight.163
Judge Posner addresses this line of reasoning simply: the IJ is not an
expert in Togolese medicine and his conclusions were based on an
assumption that medicine is practiced in Togo in the exact same way it
is practiced in the United States.164 Such “a priori views about how
authoritarian regimes conduct themselves” are no substitute for
evidence, Judge Posner said.165
Judge Posner next addresses the IJ’s treatment of Afi Marie’s
photos.166 Whereas the IJ was concerned that Afi Marie’s seemed to be
covered or masked in the photos, Judge Posner notes that women in
Togo commonly wear headdresses.167 In addition, even if she were not
wearing a headdress, Judge Posner notes that Afi Marie was diagnosed
with cerebral edema, a swelling of the brain which simply would not
be outwardly visible.168 And in case there was any doubt that Afi
Marie had a head injury, Judge Posner points out that her other two
diagnoses, chronic insomnia and psychosis are two symptoms a
cerebral edema.169
When Judge Posner addresses the date stamp on the photos, he
notes that whatever the “03 4 16” marking on the photos means, it is
not a date.170 The numbers could not represent a 2003 photo date
because the photos were submitted with Afi Marie’s 2002 asylum
application.171 Furthermore, the numbers could not be the result of a

163

Id.
Id.
165
Id. (quoting Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 2006)).
166
Id. at 895.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 896.
171
Id.
164
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forgery attempt because then they would have had the correct date on
them.172
Finally, Judge Posner addresses Afi Marie’s ability to return to
Togo and then later leave a second time.173 For Judge Posner, because
Afi Marie was relatively wealthy and, because her husband was still in
hiding, the desire to return to Togo to retrieve money and to find her
husband would have been sufficient to overcome any fear that she
would be harmed on her return.174 Furthermore, because she was able
to enlist the protection of an officer to escort her through customs, this
explained to Judge Posner why she was able to enter and then
subsequently leave the county where there were warrants outstanding
for Afi Marie’s arrest.175
2. Judge Posner on the IJ’s Behavior
Searching for an explanation as to why the IJ would make such
seeming lapses in logic, Judge Posner then looks to the transcript.176
There, he notes some appalling behavior on the part of the IJ.177 When
Afi Marie began her testimony in a soft voice, the IJ stopped her and
told her to shout out her testimony, warning, “if you force me
repeatedly to ask you to raise your voice I will not be pleased”178
Judge Posner points out that this invitation (“you can even scream at
the court”179) could not have been motivated by difficulty in hearing.
180
Afi Marie was speaking through a French interpreter.181 The
172

Judge Posner also notes that the record only provides photocopies of the
photographs. And he notes that it would have been the Department of Homeland
Security, not Afi Marie, who had control over the photos. Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 897.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
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interpreter had no problems hearing Afi Marie.182 And the IJ did not
seem to have any problems hearing the interpreter.183
Another reason why the IJ asked Afi Marie to speak loudly was
because he felt that it “also might indicate the posture of [Afi Marie’s]
case as well.”184 Apparently, the IJ presumed some sort of positive
correlation between the loudness of testimony and its truthfulness – to
which Judge Posner notes, “I have never before heard it suggested that
truthfulness can be inferred from a witness’s decibel level.”185
Had the IJ’s behavior simply remained unorthodox, that might not
have warranted criticism. However, this unorthodoxy turned into
hostility, which Judge Posner additionally commented upon. The IJ
asked for proof that Afi Marie’s husband owned a radio station, and
she was able to provide a photograph of her husband at the radio
station.186 In response, he stated, “I have photographs also in high
school where I took pictures with a radio transmitter there. Does that
mean that that is an operating business because you have a
photograph?”187 And lest there be any confusion as to what the IJ was
specifically looking for, the IJ clarified that he was looking for
evidence in the record “from the listeners to verify that they heard the
station.”188
Judge Posner also noted two problems with the way the IJ treated
Afi Marie’s testimony about her husband’s garbage collection
business. The IJ wanted more information about the nature of the

181

Id.
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id. (quoting the IJ as explaining, “If you’re really strong in your convictions
you’ll express it in a strong manner. If your answers are weak the Court may believe
that you’re [sic] claim is also weak so conduct yourself accordingly.”).
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
182
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collection business, to which Afi Marie admitted that she could not
provide much help.189 But the IJ just would not let it go:
Q: A spouse does not know what her husband is doing
when he’s working, is that what you wish me to
believe?
A: Yes. In Africa, it is very difficult for a woman to be
involved in her husband’s business.
Q: So, when he goes to work in the morning you don’t
know where he’s going, is that what you’re saying?
He doesn’t tell you.
A: He tells me that he goes to work but I don’t follow
him to see where he, he’s would go.
Q: That’s amazing.
Q: (to the interpreter) You want to tell her that’s
amazing. You want to tell her.190
To his credit, the IJ eventually did let Afi Marie know what type of
evidence he was looking for.191 He explained that he was looking for
statements from former employees of Afi Marie’s husband that would
verify their employment.192 To which Judge Posner replied, “does
Judge Brahos really expect garbage men in Togo to provide affidavits
concerning their former employer, now an enemy of the state?”193
Based upon these exchanges, Judge Posner believes that the
deference normally afforded to an IJ’s adverse credibility
determination should not apply.194 Typically, such deference derives
from being able to observe the demeanor of a witness who testifies.195
The majority relies heavily on this point, stating that it was the IJ and
189

Id.
Id. at 898.
191
Id. at 897.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 893-894.
195
Id. at 897.
190
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not the appellate court that spent six hours with Afi Marie.196 Judge
Posner responds, however, that the deference should not apply where
the underlying rationale is absent.197 Because of the fact that the IJ had
to listen to the testimony through an interpreter and had to observe the
mannerisms of a person from another culture, Judge Posner doubts
that mere observation gives an IJ any more of an ability to filter for the
truth.198
3. Judge Posner on the Problems with the Immigration Court System
in General
As scathing and thorough as Judge Posner’s dissent was, he
ultimately signals that the shortcomings in the handling of Afi Marie’s
case are institutional rather than individual.199 He cites the Herculean
task ascribed to IJs, noting the horrendous workloads, the typical lack
of reliable evidence, the generally poor conditions from which the
asylum applicants arrive, and the overall unfamiliarity of Americans
with those foreign countries and cultures.200
Judge Posner personally, along with other judges from several
circuit courts of appeal, has criticized the immigration system as
necessarily engendering bad decisions.201 Here, Judge Posner once
196

Id. at 893 (majority opinion).
Id. at 897 (Posner, J., dissenting).
198
Id.
199
Id. at 898.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 886 n.2 (majority opinion):
The system is in turmoil as the nation’s immigration judges (218 at last
count) struggle to complete some 350,000 cases a year, all without law
clerks, bailiffs, stenographers, and often competent lawyers and
interpreters. Often, immigration judges are hearing three contested
hearings a day and up to 15 in a week. As Judge John M. Walker, Jr., of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, told the Senate
Judiciary Committee last April, “I fail to see how immigration judges can
be expected to make thorough and competent findings of fact and
conclusions of law under these circumstances.”
197

Id.
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again faults both Congress and the Justice Department for failing to
correct at least those conditions over which it has control.202
Ultimately, however, as morally forgivable as Judge Posner finds the
actions of the IJ in this case, he reasons that the behavior was still
legally deficient.203 Therefore, he dissents, stating, “The immigration
judge’s opinion is pervaded by gross errors of fact and logic, and read
in light of the hearing transcript is an embarrassment to American
justice.”204
III. IJ BIAS: THE CONTAMINATION THEORY
Courts have had a difficult time figuring out quite how to address
the various arguments raised on appeal where there is both IJ bias and
an adverse credibility determination involved. The following section
will first discuss the shortcomings in the current scheme. Then, this
section will discuss the benefits of applying a contamination theory in
adverse credibility determination cases. Finally, this section will
conclude with a discussion of how the contamination theory would
apply in Afi Marie’s case.
A. The Existing Standards are Inadequate
The problem with the due process challenge is that it is too
narrow and only detects the most egregious cases of IJ bias. The
Seventh Circuit’s approach to due process challenges based on IJ bias,
and that of many other circuits, requires actual prejudice.205 Only in
202

Id. at 898 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Id.
204
Id.
205
See, e.g., Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 2003)
(declining to find a due process violation even though IJ exhibited “a lack of
courtesy and the absence of the expected level of professionalism.”); Elias v.
Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 2007) (“we are especially troubled by the
conduct of the IJ during the hearing and its effect on the petitioner’s ability to testify
accurately.”); e.g., Ciroba v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding
that IJ’s initial assessment of the evidence “without more, do[es] not establish bias
203
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the most flagrant of circumstances does improper IJ behavior
constitute reversible error.206 Otherwise, the applicant must show that
they suffered a physical or procedural inability to testify. A physical
inability occurs when harsh or over-zealous cross-examination frazzles
the witness, making it difficult for the witness to continue testifying.207
A procedural inability occurs when an IJ’s actions bars critical
testimony or evidence.208
This standard overlooks the possibility that there are cases where
the bias of the IJ, albeit falling short of the due process violation
standard, has incorrectly denied benefits to a deserving applicant.
Assume that two asylum applicants with identical histories of actual
persecution face the same, biased IJ. If one asylum applicant breaks
down in tears in response to inappropriate IJ behavior, and if the other
asylum applicant merely withdraws into silence, this would lead to an
odd result upon review of the adverse credibility determination.
Because of the prejudice requirement, the same behavior of the IJ
could produce different results for the similarly situated asylum
applicants who faced similar IJ bias. The petitioner who broke down in
tears would have shown actual prejudice, warranting remand. The
petitioner who simply remained silent under the same inappropriate IJ
behavior would not be able to show prejudice – she would not be
entitled to a new hearing. Thus, because it could produce different
results between two identically situated asylum applicants, a prejudice
requirement is inappropriate in the review of adverse credibility
determinations.

on the part of the IJ.”); Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000)
(requiring a showing that the outcome of the proceeding may have been affected).
206
For example, in Floriou v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 2007),
where the Seventh Circuit granted a petition for review where the IJ blamed the
asylum applicants themselves for being persecuted. Id. The IJ called the asylum
applicants “zealots” and concluded that they were harmed only because they
provoked their attackers with their religious beliefs. Id.
207
Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 885-886 (majority opinion) (quoting Giday
v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 549 (7th Cir. 2006)).
208
Id. (quoting Kerciku v. INS, 314 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2002)).

438
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

29

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 13

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

There are instances, however, where the requirement of actual
prejudice is desirable. If an IJ has found an applicant to be credible but
has denied the application on the merits, remand for a new hearing
may not be necessary. In that situation, the IJ takes the asylum
applicant’s claims as true. The only challenge would be whether the
facts, as the applicant portrays them, qualify the applicant for asylum.
The denied but credible applicant would factually have nothing new to
add. This challenge on the merits is adequately addressed by the
existing standards of review.
However, where the rejection is based on an adverse credibility
determination, courts should apply a contamination standard. Once it
is determined that the IJ has crossed that line into IJ bias, this should
constitute reversible error. Where the IJ has exhibited an inability to
remain impartial in making subjective evaluations such as is required
in gauging truthfulness, such subjective evaluations should not be
given much weight.
B. The Contamination Theory Better Achieves the Goals of Asylum
Law
What is unique to the immigration systems is the extent to which
bias is tolerated. In a state or federal court, potential jurors may be
excused for cause, or they may be excused through a peremptory
challenge.209 Judges in jury trial or a bench trial may excuse
themselves if their participation would be biased or would harbor even
the appearance of bias.210 Removing bias from the courtroom is
necessary to the accuracy of the fact-finder’s result. Similarly, in the
immigration context, we should demand impartiality from the IJ,
particularly when the IJ makes as subjective a determination as
truthfulness.
Applying a contamination theory to inappropriate IJ behavior
better achieves the goals of asylum law because of the intermediate
standard it provides. When reviewing an adverse credibility
209
210

E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2006); 725 ILCS 5/115-4(d).
28 U.S.C. §144 (2006).
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determination, even bias that does not reach the level of a due process
violation should be considered grounds for granting a petition for
review. The IJ is unique in that the IJ is called upon to make findings
in a system that cannot avail itself to the normal barometers of
truthfulness. As Judge Posner’s dissent noted, the ability to observe the
witness testify is of lesser value when the asylum applicant testifies
through an interpreter and brings to the stand the cultural mannerisms
of the unfamiliar country from which she came.211 Where the IJ has
very little corroborative documentary evidence to go on and must
make decisions on whether an asylum applicant is telling the truth, we
should demand the highest degree of impartiality and tolerate the least
amount of bias. Where the IJ shows bias, it not only “demeans the
witness,”212 but this also affects the IJ’s ability to appropriately weigh
the evidence.
Yet, except in the most extreme cases,213 IJ bias does not
constitute a factor in whether the IJ’s decision was an abuse of
discretion. For example, in Afi Marie’s case, the Seventh Circuit
majority examined the due process argument first and then separately
analyzed the challenge to the adverse credibility determination.214 This
has the effect of insulating IJ bias from detection. On review, even a
biased credibility determination will be reviewed under an abuse of
discretion.
The unacceptability of this result is highlighted when placed up
against the rationales for why IJs are even allowed such a degree of
211

Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 897 (Posner, J., dissenting)
Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2006) (granting petition for
review where IJ argued with and intimidated asylum applicant).
213
Recently, the Seventh Circuit joined the Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits in recognizing that there are instances where the effect of IJ bias is palpable
from the cold record alone. Foriou v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir, 2007).
Those cases do not preempt the need for a contamination theory of IJ bias. In each of
those cases, the petition for review could have been granted on other bases, such as
through a challenge of the adverse credibility determination or through the due
process analysis. If IJ bias is to serve as a basis for remand, it should be construed to
have its own distinct purpose.
214
Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 884 (majority opinion).
212
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participation in the first place. The presumption supporting the ability
of the IJ to depart from a judge’s normally hands-off role is that,
without such interference by the IJ, the asylum applicant, who is
unfamiliar with the English language and American legal system,
would be unable to sufficiently plead their case for asylum.215 And so
to avoid this injustice, and so as to ensure that we grant asylum to
those who deserve it, we allow the IJs to step in and develop the
record more fully. However, where the policy concerns that permit the
IJ to interfere are absent, tolerance of IJ participation should decrease.
Thus, where the asylum applicant is represented by an attorney,
the IJ should not be as intrusive as the IJ might be if the asylum
applicant were proceeding pro se. If the asylum applicant is
represented, and if the government’s interests are similarly represented
by counsel, the rationale for departing from the traditional adversarial
system disappears. Yet, there is no rule against IJ participation, even
where all parties are represented by counsel.
The regulations provide that the IJ may perform a direct
examination, a cross examination, or otherwise participate in order to
fully develop the record.216 However, the trend has been for IJs to take
this privilege one step further. Rarely do IJs help elicit favorable
testimony. Instead, they more often try to debunk the asylum
applicant’s claims.217 While there is no regulatory bar against pressing
an asylum applicant to find the truth, there needs to be something
more than the due process consideration to prevent the IJ from
215

See Hasanaj v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 780, 783 (7th Cir. 2004) (agreeing with
the government’s contention during oral argument that “the fact that an IJ asks
questions during the proceedings is helpful to develop the record and is better than a
silent bench that says nothing throughout the proceedings and then denies the request
for asylum because the petitioner did not provide sufficient evidence”).
216
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2006).
217
E.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (listing
various cases within the Seventh Circuit where IJs were hostile, abusive, biased, or
skewed with prejudgment). See also Reyes-Melendez v. INS, 342 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir
2003) (discussing cases where IJ has “behaved not as a neutral fact-finder interested
in hearing the petitioner’s evidence, but as a partisan adjudicator seeking to
intimidate the [alien] and his counsel.”).
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becoming a second Attorney General working against the asylum
applicant.
C. Applying the Theory to Afi Marie’s Case
Creating a rule to detect IJ bias will necessarily be multi-factored,
and it will also necessarily require a case-by-case development of IJ
contamination law. But that doesn’t mean that Courts would be
without guidance. To determine whether an IJ was biased, courts
should look to the same factors that IJs use for making adverse
credibility determinations: demeanor, internal inconsistency,
corroboration, and plausibility.
1. Demeanor
As a factor in the contamination analysis, courts should view
combative demeanor as circumstantial evidence of pre-decision. In
examining the IJ’s demeanor for bias, courts should compare the IJ’s
behavior with what would normally be expected of a judge. Where the
IJ fails to show the “patience and dignity befitting a person privileged
to exercise judicial authority,”218 courts should construe the IJ’s
demeanor as circumstantial evidence of a compromised decisionmaking ability.
In Afi Marie’s case, Judge Posner found the IJ’s performance in
Afi Marie’s case to be “appalling.”219 To conclude, he went so far as to
call the IJ’s decision as “an embarrassment to American justice.”220
Even the majority conceded that the IJ’s behavior was “hardly a model
of patience and decorum.”221 The majority further described the IJ’s
behavior as “unseemly,”222 “mocking,”223 “demonstrat[ing]
218

See Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2006),
Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 898 (Posner, J., dissenting).
220
Id.
221
Id. at 886 (majority opinion).
222
Id.
223
Id.
219
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intemperance,”224 and “jarring.”225 Under either the majority’s or the
dissent’s view of this case, the IJ’s behavior falls far short of the level
of decorum necessary to impart a sense of reliability in the result.
Thus, under a contamination theory, the demeanor factor would favor
remand.
2. Internally Inconsistent
When immigration judges conduct their adverse credibility
determination analyses, they frequently rely upon internal
inconsistencies to discredit the testimony.226 Similarly, if an IJ is
internally inconsistent in terms of what is required of the asylum
applicant, courts should consider the reliability of the IJs rulings to be
undermined. Internal inconsistency in IJ decisions presents itself as the
impossibility of satisfying the IJ’s evidentiary requirements. This
factor may be satisfied where the IJ requires supporting documents for
certain portions of the asylum applicant’s testimony but
simultaneously rejects the supporting evidence that same type of
document when produced for other portions of the testimony.
Letters from home are one frequent way in which asylum
applicants try to corroborate their claims. Some letters will function
more like affidavits and describe the persecutory behavior expressly,
but most will discuss persecution tangentially. For example, asylum
applicants have submitted letters indicating whether it would be safe to
return,227 whether the applicant’s friends back in their home countries
were killed,228 or whether others were under surveillance or were
arrested.229 However, when submitted, these types of letters are
224

Id.
Id. at 887.
226
See, e.g., Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining
that an applicant’s claims “may be so internally inconsistent or implausible on its
face that a reasonable fact-finder would not credit it”).
227
Oyekunle v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 715, 716 (7th Cir. 2007).
228
Tchemkou v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 785, 794 (7th Cir. 2007).
229
Gebreeyesus v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 952, 954 (7th Cir. 2007).
225
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frequently discounted by IJs on the grounds that they were written by
family members who would write anything,230 were not specific
enough,231 or otherwise deserved little weight.
In Afi Marie’s case, the IJ wanted some sort of evidence from
listeners of her husband’s radio station in Togo or evidence from
former employees of her husband’s garbage collection company.232
When she could not provide either type of letter, the IJ presumed that
her husband must not have held waste disposal contracts and must not
have had a radio station at all, even despite the fact that Afi Marie also
submitted a photo of her husband at the station.233
What is perhaps the most baffling in the IJ’s treatment of the
documentary evidence is that, when Afi Marie provided letters from
her cousins that her home had been looted and from her father that the
authorities were looking for her, the IJ deems the letters as deserving
little weight.234 He criticizes one letter as not being specific enough,
while the other one as containing apparent “exaggerations.”235 This is
an evidentiary game that seems impossible for asylum applicants to
win.
The impossibility of satisfying the IJ in this case is further
exemplified by the treatment of the other witnesses in this case. The IJ
230

Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006). The asylum
applicant had his family mail his father’s death certificate to him to support his
applicant’s claim. The IJ expressed his concerns as to the authenticity of such a
document by asking, “Well, sir, if you asked for a certificate saying that you’re the
president of Bangladesh, would they send you something?” Id.
231
Adekpe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2007). Although the
asylum applicant in this case submitted corroborating letters from his family, the IJ
found them insufficient because they did not “corroborate the incidents that occurred
specifically to him.” Id.
232
Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 897 (7th Cir. 2007) (Posner,
J., dissenting).
233
Id.
234
Decision of the Immigration Judge at 11-12, In the Matter of Afi Marie
Apouviepseakoda, Immigration Court, Chicago, Illinois, (June 14, 2004), available
at www.ca7.uscourts.gov (follow “Briefs” link, search for case No. 05-3752, follow
“05-3752” link, follow “05-3752_002.pdf” link).
235
Id.
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noted that it was already 6:45pm and that “there’s only so much time
that the Court can grant to you.”236 In the interests of time, the IJ stated
that he would accept an offer of proof regarding the testimony of the
Apouviepseakoda family friend and Afi Marie’s daughter.237 The
family friend was also a refugee of Togo who began working with a
Canadian organization that documented Togolese abuses.238 In
addition, this witness also had direct, personal knowledge on the
participation and support of the Apouviepseakoda family for the
opposition party.239 If the IJ accepted the offer of proof, as he stated
that he would, the inconsistencies questioning Afi Marie’s and her
husband’s affiliation with the opposition party should have dissolved.
Yet, despite the IJ’s acceptance of the offer of proof, this witness’
testimony was ignored and the alleged inconsistencies remained.
The second witness who would have testified, were it not for the
IJ, was Afi Marie’s daughter.240 She was going to testify to the beating
that she saw the Togolese soldiers inflict upon her mother.241 If the IJ
is going to accept the offer of proof, he should have considered the
fact that Afi Marie's daughter would have provided testimony
consistent with Afi Marie’s. This would have been a crucial point of
corroborating testimony—one that the IJ frequently complained was
lacking in Afi Marie’s asylum claim242—but the ability of the offers of

236

Brief of Petitioner at 19, Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881 (7th
Cir. 2007) (No. 05-3752), available at www.ca7.uscourts.gov (follow “Briefs” link,
search for case No. 05-3752, follow “05-3752” link, follow “05-3752_001.pdf”
link).
237
Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 888 (majority opinion).
238
Brief of Petitioner, supra note 70, at 19-20.
239
Id. at 20.
240
Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 888.
241
Brief of Petitioner, supra note 70, at 19.
242
See, e.g., Decision of the Immigration Judge at 5, In the Matter of Afi Marie
Apouviepseakoda, Immigration Court, Chicago, Illinois, (June 14, 2004), available
at www.ca7.uscourts.gov (follow “Briefs” link, search for case No. 05-3752, follow
“05-3752” link, follow “05-3752_002.pdf” link) (discussing photos and medical
certificate).
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proof to rehabilitate and corroborate Afi Marie’s testimony did not
figure into the IJ's calculus.
Afi Marie’s daughter would have provided a second point of
corroborating testimony that the IJ complained was missing. The
daughter would have been able to provide precisely that information
that the IJ wanted:
Q: Do we have any license from the government of
Togo authorizing your husband to operate a station in
Togo?
A. Yes, we had documents, but as I was leaving Lome I
had difficulties and I couldn’t collect all the documents.
Q. I see you have some documents here, but does this
mean that this is an operating business or how do I
know this was not a station that was expected to go on
line and needed completion before it did so?
A. Well, you can ask my, my daughter.
Q. I see. Well, would I expect your daughter to
contradict you? And how, how ---this radio station, can
you tell me what it’s potential to reach the public?
A. Yes.
Q. And what, what – did it have a regular schedule
operation?
A. Yes, the radio has a schedule.
Q. And how did the public understand when to tune in
to this radio station?
A. If you turn your radio on, turn your radio on 97.5 or
you hear the radio.
Q. I see. Now this radio station 95 – 97.5, well, how,
how – was there any programming, any, any circulation
of scheduling for the general public so they know when
to tune in to hear any particular programming?
A. This I, yes, there was a schedule circulated, but since
I was not involved in, in that business I, I really can’t
tell you how they were circulated. All I know is that my
husband had a functioning radio station.

446
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

37

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 13

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

Q. I see. Do we have anything to verify that that was
true other than your statements?
A. I have a photo.
Q. I see. I see a photo too. I have photographs also in
high school where I took pictures with a radio
transmitter there. Does that mean that that is an
operating business because you have a photograph?
A. I couldn’t gather all the paper, all the documents
together. It’s necessary to ask my child.
Q. To wit, ma’am, I don’t want to hear the question ask
my child because your child is not going to be the
confirming information for the Court.243
Afi Marie consistently and repeatedly admitted that she knew very
little about this business.244 The daughter would have testified that the
radio station did exist and that her father was indeed the owner.245 But,
even after the IJ accepted the offer of proof regarding the daughter’s
testimony, the IJ’s skepticism regarding the operational status of the
radio station remained. The impossibility of satisfying the IJ’s
evidentiary demands was clear. Afi Marie had the very evidence that
the IJ was looking for, but when she presented it, it was always
somehow insufficient.
3. Corroboration (Arguing Outside the Record)
When invoked, the corroboration requirement demands that
asylum applicants be able to bolster their claims with documentary
evidence.246 Similarly, when an IJ’s adverse credibility determination
is being challenged for bias, reviewing courts should examine the
extent to which an IJ forms conclusions based upon evidence not in
the record on appeal. Typically, IJ opinions that lack such
243

Brief of Petitioner, supra note 70, at 17-18.
Id.
245
Id. at 19.
246
Gontcharova v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 2004).
244
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corroboration rely upon the personal experiences of the IJ to draw
conclusions from the asylum applicant’s testimony.247 The problem
with IJs relying upon personal experience, or what they perceive as
“common sense,” is that what is common in the United States is not
necessarily common in a foreign culture.248 The problem with
reviewing a biased IJ’s decision is that the reviewing court will be
tempted in to looking for ways to show that the IJ wasn’t that far off.
This leads to the incorporation of unsupported assumptions of the IJ.
On several occasions, the Seventh Circuit majority’s analysis
becomes this sort of fact-finding foray. The IJ found two problems
with the signed medical certificate that Afi Marie submitted. First, the
IJ noted that the physician saw Afi Marie “in consultation” as opposed
to having been her treating physician.249 The IJ explained, “some
injuries are a result of a complication because of preexisting condition
and the treating doctor would have that information in his report.”250
Apparently, the IJ was concerned that, to the extent that Afi Marie was
being treated for legitimate injuries, it may have been due to an
automobile accident.251 However, nothing in the record suggests that
there was ever any car accident.252 There is similarly nothing in the
record to suggest that treating physicians in Togo would have
information different than what consulting physicians in Togo would
have.253 The IJ’s reliance upon this distinction to discredit Afi Marie’s
testimony should be construed as evidence of a tainted adverse
credibility determination.

247

See e.g., Jiang v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 992, 995 (7th Cir. 2007).
As Judge Posner notes in his dissent, “Most asylum applicants come from
distant, poor, and poorly governed countries about which Americans, including the
immigration judges, who are not selected for their knowledge of foreign countries,
know nothing.” Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 898 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Posner, J., dissenting).
249
Id. at 895.
250
Id. at 896.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
Id.
248
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Second, the physician who signed Afi Marie’s medical certificate
specialized in ‘‘Gynecology–Obstetrics, General Medicine.”254 The IJ
ignores the “General Medicine” portion of the title to find that it was
inconsistent for Afi Marie to have been treated for serious bodily
injuries by an Ob-Gyn.255 The Seventh Circuit took this a step further
when it noted that Afi Marie’s initial visit to the doctor was in April
which happened to be the same month she visited the doctor when she
returned to Togo: “This April visit to a gynecologist prompts us to note
a coincidence not recognized by the IJ.”256 This newly noted
coincidence is problematic for the same reason that IJs are so strictly
confined to the evidence in their records. The Seventh Circuit
majority’s intimation presumes to understand common medical
practice amongst Togolese doctors and patients. The record is certainly
silent as to whether Togolese woman have adopted the practice of
obtaining an annual examination by the gynecologists. And there is
nothing in the record to suggest that Afi Marie could not go to the
same hospital for trauma as for a gynecological exam. Finally, the IJ’s
characterization of the second trip to the Togo hospital as being
elective is entirely irrational. If Afi Marie simply needed to have a
gynecological exam, why would she not have waited until she returned
to the medical system of the United States? There must have been
some reason for her to see a doctor there. Her attendance to her
medical health should not be construed as an inconsistency,
particularly where there is nothing in the record to support the IJ’s or
the Seventh Circuit’s explanation.
4. Plausibility (logic)
Even if the asylum applicant’s claim is internally consistent and
supported through documentary evidence, the IJ may make an adverse

254

Id. at 891 n.6 (majority opinion).
Id. at 895 (Posner, J., dissenting).
256
Id. at 891 n.6 (majority opinion) (emphasis in original).
255
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credibility determination on the basis of implausibility.257
Analogously, where the IJ’s decision is being challenged for bias,
reviewing courts should look to the plausibility of the reasons for the
IJ’s adverse credibility determination. In other words, courts should
look simply to whether the IJ is being logical.
In Afi Marie’s case, Judge Posner describes the logical pitfalls in
the IJ’s decision as “yawning chasms.”258 The biggest obstacle for the
IJ seems to be the numbers stamped on the Lome hospitalization
photos. Each of the two photographs submitted by Afi Marie had the
numbers “03 4 16” on them,259 with the “03” portion being more
difficult to make out than the other numbers.260 The IJ asked whether
the numbers meant that the photos were taken on April 16, 2003—a
problematic date given that her hospitalization occurred in 2001 and
her asylum application was filed in 2002.261 Afi Marie could only
respond, “I think it’s just a date because I wasn’t in Lome in the year
2003.”262 Furthermore, Judge Posner notes that the IJ did not question
the fact that the photos were submitted with the rest of the 2002
asylum application.263 Given the date Afi Marie submitted her
materials, it is simply implausible that the numbers represent a date.264
The IJ’s insistence, in the face of this apparent inconsistency, should
be construed as evidence of bias.
CONCLUSION
It is far from clear whether Afi Marie qualifies for asylum. But
what is clear is that her adverse credibility determination was tainted
257

8 U.S.C. §1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006); Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821
(7th Cir. 2007).
258
Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 897 (Posner, J., dissenting).
259
Id. at 896.
260
Id. at 890 (majority opinion).
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 896 (Posner, J., dissenting).
264
Id.
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with bias. Her petition for review should have been granted with
instructions to remand to a new immigration judge. Because the
adverse credibility determination completely incapacitates the asylum
claim, courts should be more cautious in the amount of bias that they
tolerate on review. The four factors of IJ bias in an adverse credibility
setting proposed in this note are by no means exhaustive. And by no
means would all four factors need be present to warrant remand.
The current safeguards against pre-decision and IJ bias detect too
few decisions that should be vacated. Where IJ bias reaches a level
sufficient for reversal on due process considerations, a reviewing court
would easily be able to reverse on a challenge to the adverse
credibility determination itself. The contamination theory applies in
those instances where the IJ’s adverse credibility determination is not
as patently incorrect. Where the IJ is denying an asylum applicant’s
claim not on the merits, but on the basis of an adverse credibility
determination, the threshold tolerance for bias should be low. This is
the only way that we can rely upon the findings of fact from a system
where the usual aids in detecting truth are unavailable.
Because the denial of an asylum application can literally be a
matter of life and death, the immigration system should strive to
minimize the number of denials to deserving applicants. To the extent
that some error is unavoidable, the immigration system should err on
the side of caution.
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